The theory of kin selection was introduced by Hamilton (1963 Hamilton ( , 1964 and developed further by many others in terms of help directed from one relative (the donor) toward another (the recipient). In this paper, as well as its companion (Eshel and Motro 1988) , we deal with the more complex (though quite common) situation in which an individual needs help, and this help can be provided (with some risk to the donor) by each of several relatives.
In such a situation, even if Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives is satisfied, it is advantageous to stand by and wait for another relative to take the risk and help the relative in need. It is true, though, that if all helpers are passive, Hamilton's argument again holds, and any potential helper can increase its own inclusive fitness by exclusively taking the risk and saving the relative in need. However, this entails an even greater increase in the inclusive fitness of the other relatives that decided not to offer their help.
The analysis of situations involving more than one potential helper carried out in the preceding paper (Eshel and Motro 1988) and in this paper reveals that if Hamilton's condition for one-to-one altruism does not hold, full selfishness is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) independent of the number of helpers. If, however, Hamilton's condition is satisfied, the ESS in the multiple-help cases is usually a mixed strategy of altruism and selfishness, characterized by a positive probability of providing the needed help.
In the preceding paper we analyzed situations in which immediate help is needed. In such cases, each potential helper has to decide instantaneously whether or not to offer its help, without knowing what the other potential helpers are doing. Here we discuss the case of delayed help. Each potential helper can wait in the hope that another relative will take the risk and help the individual in need; yet if they all hesitate too long, it might be too late for the relative in distress.
We first present an ESS model of delayed help, based on arguments of the maximization of inclusive fitness. We then add a simple genetic model, whose results coincide (at least for the case studied) with those obtained by the ESS If any of the n -1 relatives in the group gives a helping hand, it succeeds and saves the individual in trouble, but it has a probability c > 0 of losing its life while saving B.
If B has not been saved and is still alive at time t, then each of the n -1 potential helpers has a probability XAt + o(At) of offering its help during the time interval (t, t + At). Hence, for each potential helper, the time passed until offering its help (if help has not been provided yet and the relative in need is still alive) is exponentially distributed with expectation 1/X.
We are looking for a value of X that is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
Such a strategy, if adopted by a large enough part of the population, becomes advantageous, in terms of inclusivefitness, over any other strategy adopted by the minority (Maynard Smith and Price 1973) .
Assume that the prevailing strategy in the population is X, and consider the inclusive fitness of a rare mutant (call it I) with a strategy x #& X. We concentrate on mutations of limited probabilistic effect (Eshel and Motro 1988) ; hence, this mutant is likely to be the only one in its group. If the individual in need dies before help has been offered (the probability of this event is p,/[X(n -2) + x + p']), the inclusive fitness of I is 1 -r.
If help is offered by any of the other n -2 relatives (the probability is X(n -2)/ [X(n -2) + x + pj), the inclusive fitness of I is 1 -rc. (The individual in trouble is saved, whereas the helper dies with probability c.)
Finally, if I is the one that helps B (the probability of this event is xI[X(n -2) + x + pj), its inclusive fitness is 1 -c.
Hence, the (unconditional) inclusive fitness of I is X(n -2)(1 -rc) + x(l -c) + pL(1 -r) and we are looking for the strategy x(X) that maximizes flx(x).
Differentiating QAx(X) with respect to x yields
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Hence, QAx(X) is either always increasing or always decre not change with x if the numerator in the right-hand side of eq. 2 is zero.) Denote by k the value of X for which the numerator vanishes. Thus,
Hence, the smaller x is, the larger the inclusive fitness of the mutant having the strategy x, and this holds whatever the value of X (the strategy prevailing in the population). Thus, if r < c, the only ESS that exists is X = 0 (i.e., the strategy of absolute selfishness).
If, however, r > c, then fQA(X) is a monotonically increasing function of x if X < A, and it is a monotonically decreasing function of x if X > A. (It has the constant value 1 -c for all x if X = X.) If X < X, then any mutant with a strategy x > X has a selective advantage over the prevailing type (which has the strategy X), whereas if X > X, any mutant with
x < X has a selective advantage over X. Hence, X is the only ESS.
Notice that the condition r > c is the same as Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives. Thus, we obtain result 1.
Result 1: (a) If Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives is not satisfied (i.e., if r < c), absolute selfishness is the only ESS. For r > c, the evolutionarily stable strategy X is an increasing function of r (the relatedness) and of p. (the danger to the relative in need). It is a decreasing function of c (the cost to the helper) and of n -1 (the number of potential helpers). Hence, the larger the group, the smaller the evolutionarily stable tendency to help a relative in need. Indeed, X tends to zero as n approaches infinity.
Assume now that the population is fixed on the ESS, and let us examine the probability that each potential helper will be a donor and the probability that the individual in trouble will be saved.
If Hamilton's condition for altruism between two relatives does not hold, the ESS is absolute selfishness, and both probabilities-that of providing help and that of getting help-are zero, independent of group size.
If Hamilton's condition holds, then for each potential helper, the probability of its being a donor is
a decreasing function of n, which tends to zero as n approaches infinity. The probability that the individual in need will be saved is Fn = fln(n -1) = r-c (n -2) (r c) , r ( -c6 r-c+r(n-2) (r -c ) r-Ic)
Fn is also a decreasing function of n, but unlike Jn, it does not tend to zero as n approaches infinity. Consider a diploid population and broods of a fixed size (n). Any sib will volunteer and help its brother in need according to its genetically determined, single-locus strategy.
Let AA be the wild type, and let A be the strategy of this type (i.e., the probability that AA will offer its help during any time interval of length A\t is XAt + o(/t), provided that the brother in need has not been saved before the beginning of that time interval and that it is still alive). Let a be a rare mutation, and let Aa individuals have the strategy x =$ X. Assume that in each generation exactly one individual in a brood needs help.
A typical brood consists exclusively of AA individuals. For any one of them, the probability of being the one in need is 1 /n, and in that case, it has a probability i/[X(n -1) + p] of not getting help and dying. If someone else in the brood needs help (the probability of this event is 1 -l/n), the probability that an individual will provide this help is X/[X(n -1) + pj, and the probability that it dies in i attempt to save the brother in need is c. Hence, for any sib in the brood, the probability of dying as a result of the described situation is
If the frequency of allele a is small enough (E > 0), the viability of a random AA individual is w1 + o(E). The rare allele a is usually carried, with probability 1 -o(E), by a heterozygote Aa, which is an offspring of an AA x Aa mating. The probability that Aa has exactly k Aa brothers (and n -1 -k AA brothers) is (fl -1) 1 k J2n-Hence, for Aa, the probability of dying is
The viability of a random Aa is W2 + o(E). Natural selection operates for (against) Aa, when rare, if w < W2 (if W1 > W2)) But W2(AX) = w1, and when x = X, dW2(x) = -1 E-i dx x=X n[X(n -1) + ,jU2 k=0 ( If c < 1/2 and if X < (/2 -c)/[?12(n -2)c], W2(x) increases at x =, whereas if X > ?(1/2 -c) I[ 1?2(n -2)c], 2(x) decreases at x = X. (Notice that the right-hand side of these inequalities is exactly the ESS X defined in eq. 3, with r = 1/2, i.e., X(1/2).) If X = X(1/2), then W2(x) has a global maximum at x = X(?/2) (see the Appendix); that is, W2(x) < 2[X(1/2)] = wx for all x # X (1/2).
If W2(x) decreases at x = X, then a mutant with a tendency to help x slightly larger than X will be selected against, whereas if x is slightly smaller than X, Aa has a selective advantage. The reverse holds if W2(x) increases at x = X. In both cases, natural selection favors strategies slightly closer to the ESS. If X equals the ESS, natural selection operates against any mutant with a different strategy.
Result 2: The ESS of the preceding section (which is 0 if c > 1/2 and is X, defined in eq. 3 with r = 1/2, if c < 1/2) has the property of evolutionary genetic stability, EGS (see Eshel and Feldman 1982; Eshel 1985) : it is the only strategy that, when fixed in the population, is immune to any mutation determining a different tendency to help. Moreover, if the population is fixed on a different strategy, that strategy is always unstable with respect to mutations that determine, at least in a heterozygous form, a strategy slightly closer to the EGS.
THE EFFECT OF RECIPROCITY ON THE ESS OF MULTIPLE HELP
The situation in which a group member needs help may be repeated in the future; as already mentioned elsewhere (Eshel and Cohen 1976; Eshel and Motro 1981, 1988; Motro 1988) , this possibility can lead to a higher level of mutual help than that expected by relatedness alone. This higher level of altruism does not require the existence of gratitude or memory; it is a direct consequence of kin selection itself.
We consider now a model in which the individual that volunteers and saves its relative in need can, as a result, find itself in a similar bad situation. More specifically, we assume that the helper succeeds in saving its relative's life, but with a positive probability c > 0, the helper itself gets into the same kind of trouble from which its relative has been saved. (In the delayed-help model above, the helper has a probability c of losing its life. Here, the helper has a probability c of getting into trouble, and loses its life if nobody comes to its rescue in time. Apart from this difference, all other assumptions are the same as for the delayed-help model.)
Using the same notation as in the delayed-help model, we are looking for an evolutionarily stable strategy X (that is not necessarily unique). Thus, we assume that X is the common strategy in the population and consider fQx(X), the inclusive fitness of a mutant I with a different strategy, x.
If the individual in trouble dies before help has been offered (the probability of this event is p,/[X(n -2) + x + p]), the inclusive fitness of I is 1 -r.
If help is offered by any of the other n -2 relatives (the probability is X(n -2)/ [A(n -2) + x + PD), the individual in trouble is saved, but the helper has a probability c of needing help. Thus, the inclusive fitness of I is then 1 -c + once again one relative needs help and the other n -1 relatives, including 1, are potential helpers).
If I offers help (the probability is x/[A(n -2) + x + pL]) and subsequently gets into trouble, it loses its life if not saved (the probability for that is pL/[X(n -1) + pj). If I is saved, there is a probability c that the one helping I gets into the same trouble. Hence, I's inclusive fitness, if I offers help, is
The unconditional inclusive fitness of I satisfies flx(x) (1-(r) -+ [1 c + Cflx(x)] X(n -2) X (n -2) + + LX (n -2) +x +p
(x) = ~~~~X (n -1) + p(7 flx(x) = > + A(n 2)(I c) + x[p + X(n -1)(1 -c2)] (7) X (n -l)+ p Hence, QAx(X) is a monotonic function of x. Let us define +(X) as
Thus, QAx(X) is an increasing function of x if (AX) > 0 and decreases if (
With some algebraic manipulation,
If r is larger than c, then r(n -1)(l + c) -(n -2)c > 0. Hence, (AX) is less than zero for all X, and the only ESS is that of immediate response. We denote this situation by X = oo and call it full altruism.
If r < (n -2)cl[(n -1)(1 + c)], then +(X) < 0 for all X, and the only ESS is the ESS is a mixed strategy of altruism and selfishness, with the probability of altruism monotonically decreasing to zero as group size increases.
In both cases, the probability that the relative in need will be saved (assuming an ESS response by its potential helpers) is maximal for some group size n*, and the probability is a monotonically decreasing function of the number of potential helpers once the number of helpers exceeds n*. In the case of delayed help, this "optimal" (optimal from the viewpoint of the relative in need) number is always n* = 2 (the more potential helpers, the smaller the chances of receiving aid). In the case of immediate help, however, the optimal group size n* is a number larger than or equal to 2, depending on the parameters. In both cases, the probability of getting help approaches a positive value as the number of potential helpers approaches infinity. Comparing the limits for the relevant models in both cases, we see that with equal parameters, this limit is larger for the model of delayed help. Hence, with a group of potential helpers large enough, the chances that an individual in need will be helped are larger when its potential helpers can delay their response and obtain full information about each other's behavior.
Though approached in two different ways, repetition has a similar effect in the case of immediate help (Eshel and Motro 1988) and in the case of delayed help (this paper). The possibility that the distress situation will be repeated increases the evolutionarily stable level of altruism. This higher level of mutual help is maintained without further postulates such as the existence of gratitude, the possibility of individual recognition, or even the existence of memory. The evolutionarily stable strategy of helping behavior is studied in situations involving a single relative in distress and several potential helpers. We consider cases in which no immediate help is mandatory, and at each moment every potential helper has full information on the response of others.
Although it seems always advantageous to leave the risky job of providing the needed help to any of the other potential helpers, it turns out that if Hamilton's condition for one-to-one altruism is met, the evolutionarily stable strategy is usually a mixed strategy of altruism and selfishness, characterized by a positive probability of helping. 
APPENDIX
We prove here our assertion of the delayed-help model, namely, that i
